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INTRODUCTION
In the post 11 September 2001 legal and political environment, Islam appears to have become one of the most misunderstood religions. Critics of Islam argue that Islam per se is an aggressive religion, encouraging Muslims to have recourse to violence, terrorism and destruction. 1 Muslim civilisation has been castigated
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of war in Islam. The significance of humanitarian principles within Islamic international law as well as in Islamic humanitarian law is also highlighted. The article is divided into five sections. After these introductory comments, section II analyses the nature of Islamic international law (as-siyar). Section III examines the meaning of jihad and evaluates its application within modern international law. The discussion establishes the existence of two divergent views on the nature of jihad. While reviewing these divergent views, the authors adopt a third and arguably, more contextualised and realistic approach towards the subject. Section IV examines principles of Islamic humanitarian law, and section V provides some concluding observations.
THE NATURE OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (AS-SIYAR)
Within western legal literature, there continues to remain a substantial debate over the acceptance of international law as a distinct field of law and its relationship with domestic laws. 8 Islamic international law, known as as-siyar, is in this sense substantially different from its western counterpart. First, as-siyar has been recognised as an integral part of Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence. 9 Second, as-siyar grew into a fully functional body of the Sharia 10 several centuries in advance of any similar developments in the western world. . 10 Principles of Islamic law. We like to make the point here that we believe Sharia to be based on sources of Islamic law, including the Quran and Hadith, but a human endeavour, guided and inspired by the religious text in Islam. Most writers on Islamic law equate Sharia with the Divine Will, a position from which we consciously distance ourselves. 11 One of the reasons for early development of as-siyar since the eighth century AD may well have been the conviction in Muslim theology that the Islamic nation was one entity, the Ummah, and so laws to cover various nationalities in this communitas islamica, were necessary. The various schools of Islamic juristic thought thus set about to deduce rules of international law from the sources of Islamic law. The Hanafi school of juristic thought was particularly active, and two of Abu Hanifa's (founder of the Hanafi school of thought) followers came to be known as 'fathers' of the chapters or sura (plural suras), of greatly varying length and diverse subject matter. The chapters are further divided into verses or ayat (plural ayaat). Of the 6666 verses, about 70 are addressed to the conduct of hostilities.
14 The second source of Islamic law is the Sunna or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. The Sunna consists of compilation of the Prophet Muhammad's actions, sayings and opinions during his lifetime. The general belief of Muslims is that the Quran and Sunna form the two primary sources of Islamic law. Sunna, however, does not rank as high as the Quran but is considered an important source in the interpretation of Quranic verses. The memorisation and transmission of the Sunna in a literary form is characterised as hadith. The term hadith with a meaning 'occurring, taking place' represents the 'report' of Prophet Muhammad's Sunna. 15 The Sunna is preserved and communicated to succeeding generations through the means of hadiths. 16 The third source of Islamic law is ijma, or agreement of jurists among the followers of the Prophet Muhammad in a particular age on a question of law. 17 Farooq Hassan contends that although third in the hierarchy of sources of law, ijma forms the major portion of Islamic jurisprudence. 18 Ijma, as a source of law, is supported by the Quran and Sunna. 19 The fourth source of Islamic law is qiyas, translated as analogical deduction. Analogy can only be employed, if no guidance is available on the point under discussion in any of the other three sources of law. 20 Another source of law is ijtihad, which literally means striving, exerting. Abdur Rahim defines it thus:
As a term of jurisprudence it means the application by a lawyer of all his faculties to the consideration of the authorities of the law (that is, the Quran, the Hadith and ijma) with a view to find out what in all probability the law is (that is, in a matter which is not covered by the express words of such texts and has not been determined by ijma).
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The more conservative body of Islamic scholars deny this as an independent source and believe that the 'doors of ijtihad are closed', meaning therefore that the age of independent legal reasoning in Islamic jurisprudence is over.
22 But many modern day scholars of Islamic law argue that the doors of ijtihad are always open. 
Understanding the Scope and Content of Islamic International Law
There are a range of misconceptions regarding the meaning, content and scope of as-siyar. The first of these relate to a belief that the totality of Islamic law, as expressed in the two primary sources (Quran and Sunna) represent the ultimate expression of the Divine Will 24 and that no further refinement is permissible or indeed possible in the two established sources. Other Islamic jurists however disagree and emphasise the need for continual review and development of Islamic law. According to one leading scholar Gamal Badr, a definition of as-siyar should not lose sight of the historical framework of Islam. Studies based on a single source in the classical literature or on sources pertaining to a single period are bound to be descriptive of Islam as it was at a certain point in time, not of the living and developing Islamic view of international law and relations. 25 Badr believes that the Islamic law of nations is not part of the dogma of Islam but:
[I]s the product of a continuing process of juridical speculation by authoritative jurists over the ages. The Islamic law of nations is part of the corpus of Islamic law just as the original jus gentium was a branch of municipal Roman law. Islamic law is a religious law only in the sense that its basic ethical grounds and some of its general principles are to be found in the Quran and the pronouncements of the Prophet Muhammad. Beyond that, the corpus of Islamic law as it developed over the ages is 'manmade' in the sense that it resulted from the efforts of the jurists of the various schools of law. If civil law can be described as a legislator's law 21 Rahim, op. cit., fn. 9, 143 and accompanying footnotes for Arabic sources. 22 Ibid., 147 and discussion therein. 23 [T]hough the basis of every norm of Islamic law is by theory derived directly or indirectly from God's wishes for His peoples, in arriving at what a particular norm is for a given society, the mind of the jurist is patently visible. Therefore, the mechanics of Islamic jurisprudence, functionally speaking, are similar to the contemporary working of the law of a country possessing a common law system or a civil system of law. The character of the rules of Islamic law is therefore not spiritual but clearly secular, in the sense that such rules are made for the utilitarian purposes of a society by jurists through the use of the same techniques as employed in other legal systems; however, there is a priori, a fundamental assumption that the rules so made are ultimately based on the Quran or the sunna. The human element in Islamic law is, therefore, as pronounced as it is in any other major legal system of the world.
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For purposes of our present discussion, it is important to note that apart from the Quran and Sunna compiled as Hadith (which were inspired by God but compiled by human beings after the death of the Prophet Muhammad), all the other sources of Islamic law are clearly devised by human knowledge and endeavour. This inference however does not appear to be as obvious as it should have been -leading most Muslim scholars to argue that Islamic law is divine law and hence unchangeable. Implications of this conservative view in Islamic jurisprudence for doctrines such as jihad are far reaching indeed. The predominance of this school of thought fossilises the confrontational and conflictual element of jihad, thus precluding alternative legal reasoning, compatible with present day requirements of coexistence in a world espousing diverse ideologies. It is with these concerns in mind that it is proposed to undertake a conceptual analysis of the doctrine of jihad in Islamic tradition. According to this significantly popular interpretation, the totality of jihad ideology represents a religiously sanctioned aggressive war to propagate or defend the faith. 29 In fact, so strong is the ordinance to use aggressive war, that as-siyar values are regarded as synonymous to those of the jihad. One proponent of this theory is Professor Roda Mushkat, who makes the point that:
JIHAD: ITS MEANING, SCOPE AND PURPOSE IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION
Islamic law enjoins Moslems to maintain a State of permanent belligerence with all non-believers, collectively encompassed in the dar al-harb, the domain of war. The Muslims are, therefore, under a legal obligation to reduce non-Muslim communities to Islamic rule in order to achieve Islam's ultimate objective, namely the enforcement of God's law (the Sharia) over the entire world. The instrument by which the Islamic state is to carry out that objective is called the jihad (popularly known as the 'holy war') and is always just, if waged against the infidels and the enemies of the faith.
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Since the state of belligerence and conflict is permanent, this view also regards as-siyar as exclusive to the Islamic laws of war. James Busuttil in advocating this position in his exposé 'Humanitarian Law in Islam' 31 makes the point that:
[A] primary concern of Islam, given its impetus to conversion by the sword, is the conduct of war. Indeed, the study of the law of war, the siyar, so encompasses the attitude of Islam to the non-Muslim world that it has taken on the connotation of Islamic international law in general.
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Busuttil's views appear to coincide with many Islamic scholars who perceive jihad exclusively as an instrument of aggressive war. Majid Khadduri, a prominent 29 Professor Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im makes the observation that 'the term can also refer to religiously sanctioned aggressive war to propagate or "defend" the faith. What is problematic about this latter sense of jihad is that it involves direct and unregulated violent action in pursuit of political objectives, or self-help in redressing perceived injustice, at the risk of harm to innocent bystanders…'. 
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Islamic jurist believes that Islam emerged in the seventh century as a conquering power with world domination as its goal. 33 Its notion of international law, he argues was bound to be in keeping with its mission of proselytisation of the whole of humankind. 34 Islamic law for the conduct of state was, therefore, the law of an imperial state which would recognise no equal status for the party (or parties) with whom it happened to negotiate or fight. 35 It is contended that Khadduri and Busuttil's views are too narrowly contrasted; they fail to take on board the numerous aspects of conduct of inter-state relations not covering laws of armed conflict. Those arguing for an aggressive position equate jihad as being synonymous with the use of force 36 and sometimes defined as 'holy war'. 37 As noted above, Islamic international law perceives the world as being essentially divided into dar-al-Islam and dar-al-harb, 38 and in theory, dar-al-Islam was permanently at war with dar-al-harb. Muslims were under a legal obligation to reduce dar-al-harb to Muslim rule and ultimately enforce God's law over the entire world. 39 There is evidence that this version of jihad ideology was deployed in the expansionist phase of Islam. In the chronicles of Islamic history, there are instances where the lines between violence pure and simple and jihad are blurred; certainly wars and other societal conflicts of early Islamic experience by their very nature were destructive and bloody. This image of jihad as an instrument of aggressive war is relished by those who claim fundamentally divergent 33 M. Khadduri 
Jihad and Just War: A State of Self-Exertion and Passivity
In contradistinction to the earlier position, a second view is frequently advanced by many jurists. According to this interpretation, the jihad ideology is exclusively one of self-exertion and peaceful co-existence. Proponents of this viewpoint place reliance upon the literal interpretation of the meaning of jihad as well as the primary sources of the as-siyar -the Quran and Hadith of Prophet Muhammad. The term jihad comes from the Arab verb jahada, meaning to struggle or exert. 44 The Prophet Muhammad is believed to have stated that exertion of force in battle is a minor jihad, whereas 'self-exertion in peaceful and personal compliance with the dictates of Islam (constitutes) the major or superior jihad'. 45 The Prophet Muhammad is also reported to have said that the 'best form of jihad is to speak the truth in the face of an oppressive ruler'. 46 In Islamic jurisprudence, jihad has been defined as 'exertion of one's power to the utmost of one's capacity'. social and legal ideal. War was strictly regulated and limited by compulsory legal rules based on sacred texts and equitable principles. Many Muslim scholars cite Quran and Hadith texts to put forward the argument that in the Islamic tradition (unlike popularly held belief), war is an aberration and a condition which may be resorted to only under unavoidable circumstances. 48 The view advanced is that Islam's relations with other nations -as originally expounded by the Prophet Muhammad -was based on the principle of peaceful and non-hostile relations among nations. 49 The Quran states that And if they incline to peace, incline thou also to it, and trust in God.
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So do not falter, and invite to peace when ye are the uppermost. And God is with you, and He will not grudge (the reward of) your actions.
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The fact that peace is the preferred state of affairs is borne out by the following Quranic verse:
And make ready for them all ye can of armed force and of horses tethered, that ye may dismay the enemy of God and your enemy and others besides them whom ye know not: God knoweth them. And whatsoever ye spend in the path of God, it will be repaid to you in full, and ye will not be wronged. And if they incline to peace, incline thou also to it and trust in God. Lo! He is the Hearer, the Knower.
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There is also authority in the Quran regarding avoidance of the use of force in international relations and settlement of disputes through arbitration and negotiation. A Quranic injunction states 'If two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them'.
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The expansion and propagation of Islam started initially by means of peaceful preaching and persuasion. Freedom of religion was applied in theory and practice. 54 A decade after the advent of Islam, persecution of the Prophet Muhammad and his early companions and followers gained momentum. To avoid further persecution, they fled from Makkah to Madina in 622 AD -an event known as Hijra (emigration) which also marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar. 53 Although it may be argued here that this verse is confined in its application to disputes between believers. 54 Mahmassani, loc. cit., fn. 38, 279. persistent fear of invasion from the non-Muslim forces surrounding them. It was at that time, that the doctrine of jihad in the sense of armed conflict gained currency, with the express purpose to defend the religious belief of the Muslims and to avoid extermination at the hands of the then dominant group. Thus jihad in the sense of 'holy war' was established essentially as a means of self-defence.
The expansion of Islam, according to this viewpoint is substantiated not through the use of force but a variety of factors -use of force or aggression forming only an ancillary element. Muslims perceived themselves as liberators and providers of justice, and the rationale for Islam's expansion and Muslim dominance was that:
[Islam] was the best social and political order the times could offer. It prevailed because everywhere it found politically apathetic people robbed, oppressed, bullied, uneducated, and unorganised and it found selfish and unsound governments out of touch with people. It was the broadest, freshest and cleanest political idea that had yet come into actual activity in the world. 55 Even where force was used it was strictly regulated by a body of Islamic humanitarian laws. Thus according to Eaton:
[T]he rapidity with which Islam spread across the known world of the seventh centuries was strange enough, but stranger still is the fact that no rivers flowed with blood, no fields were enriched with the corpses of the vanquished. As warriors the Arabs might have been no better than other of their kind who had ravaged and slaughtered across the peopled lands but, unlike these others, they were on a leash. There were no massacres, no rapes, no cities burned. These men feared God to a degree scarcely imaginable in our time and were in awe of His all-seeking presence, aware of it in the wind and the trees, behind every rock and in every valley. Even in these strange lands there was no place in which they could hide from this presence, and while vast distances beckoned them ever onwards they trod softly on the earth, as they had been commanded to do. There had never been a conquest like this.
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Although there is a vast array of Quranic verses and Hadith literature rendering jihad obligatory on every Muslim male, yet it is not considered a personal duty but only a general duty 57 
Contextualising and Rationalising
Jihad Ideology -Dar-al-sulh, the third way As indicated earlier, there are disagreements among jurists regarding the nature of jihad in Islam. Some argue that it is essentially defensive in nature, whereas others are inclined to consider it as including an offensive or aggressive element. 62 It is submitted that the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle, and on a historical plane one might argue that Islamic doctrine of war changed course in keeping with imperatives of time and circumstances: A critical feature in this regard is the contextualising of jihad. Originating from the premise of peaceful propagation of the Islamic faith and resort to war only as a measure of self-defence, the doctrine went through a change when persecution of Muslims by the Makkans lead to their emigration to Madina. jihad (in the sense of use of force) was established and permitted to protect Muslims and to ensure their right to practice their religion.
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With the developments in as-siyar, the expansion of Islamic jurisdictions and increasing interaction of Muslims with other equally powerful societies, the jihad ideology underwent a change. Although the instrument by which the Islamic state was meant to sustain itself and expand territorially was through waging of jihad, this did not always mean going to war. Muslim states had to acknowledge the de jure existence and legitimacy of other communities and States. jihad could take the form of intensive religious propaganda which may be construed as a continuous process of psychological and political warfare without resort to use of force in the military sense. 64 In their assessment of this phase of as-siyar, some Islamic scholars such as Khadduri, prefer to compare the conflict between dar-al-Islam and dar-al-harb to non-recognition in inter-state relations without precluding negotiations between the parties. 65 334 Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman argument provides an avenue for peaceful coexistence between dar-al-Islam and dar-al-harb which he also reinforces by referring to permissible periods of peace when jihad (in terms of use of force) stood suspended.
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With reference to the above argument, the generally accepted view of Muslim scholars on permissible periods of peace was restricted to ten years relying on the Treaty of Hubaybia made during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. 67 Later practice of Muslim states reflects extension of the ten-year rule to treaties of unlimited duration.
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Some Muslim jurists have argued that the division of the world into dar-al-Islam and dar-al-harb was necessitated by prevailing conditions and a sense of insecurity among the fledgling Muslim community. Present-day conditions evolving from historical experiences of conduct of Muslim states with their non-Muslim counterparts dictate different subdivisions. 69 These writers stress the various peaceful options available in Islam, making room for a third category beyond dar-al-Islam and dar-al-harb called dar-al-sulh (the abode or territory of peace). The dar-alsulh concept itself is based on security offered to people of dar-al-harb, i.e. promise of aman or security which must be met unconditionally, dhimmi status which made Christians, Jewish and members of other religions included as ahlal-Kitab (people of the Book) protected semi-citizens, 70 and the muwada'ah, or pacta sunt servanda, the recognition of the binding nature of treaties which could not be revoked without notice. It may be argued that introduction of the dar-alsulh as a third category of states in Islamic international law opens up the possibility of building upon options of peaceful settlement of disputes in the Islamic tradition. Dr. Gamal Badr attempts to place this tripartite notion of the world, i.e. the dar-al-Islam, dar-al-sulh and dar-al-harb in the historical perspective of Islam, stating that it has passed through three stages of unequal duration, the age of expansion, the age of interaction and the age of coexistence.
The 'age of expansion' where Islam embarked on its mission of winning the whole world. The theory elaborated by jurists of the day was to term collectively the rest of the world which was outside the domain of Islam as dar-al-harb (the abode or territory of war). The 'normal' relationship between it and the Muslim state was considered to be war. Truce was permitted but its duration could not exceed ten years. 71 (cf. the Treaty of Hudaybia). The age of expansion lasted over a century after which it became clear that the objective of carrying Islam to the four corners of the world was unattainable. The realities of interaction with non-Muslim powers imposed new juridical formulations, although some jurists carried over to the age of interaction the norms and thinking of the previous age. 66 The 'age of interaction' saw the main change in legal thought in the rationale for waging war against non-Muslims. While in the earlier period waging of war against disbelievers was justified by the mere fact of their disbelief, later jurists placed more emphasis on their hostility to and aggression against Islam as a rationale for jihad. Badr argues that it was in this age of interaction that the dichotomy of dar-al-Islam/dar-al-harb was replaced by a tripartite division of the world into dar-al-Islam, dar-al-harb and dar-al-sulh, i.e. the 'abode or territory of peace'. The dar-al-sulh is comprised of those states which, while not recognising the authority of the Muslim state over them, are not hostile and entertain friendly relations with it.
Ibid
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The 'age of coexistence' or the third age in Islamic international law coincides roughly with the formative stage of international law as we know it today. In the age of coexistence, which continues to this day, peace has come to be more widely recognised as the 'normal' relationship between the Islamic and non-Islamic states, and treaties of amity no longer need to be of fixed duration.
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The above discussion, if established as the accepted view of Muslims will have far-reaching implications for the doctrine of jihad in Islam where one of the reasons for going to war is to bring the dar-al-harb into the fold of dar-alIslam.
Many serious issues arise regarding the philosophy of jihad in the Islamic legal tradition. From a survey of the writings of some scholars on the subject, it is evident that applicability of the doctrine is not confined to self-defence. 74 It is permissible as an instrument of reprisal against a rebellious population, including apostates, in support of allies in foreign jurisdictions, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Finally, one may also argue that jihad may be used as a tool for expansion of the Muslim faith, lending strength to the argument that Islam spread by the sword. 
Observations Regarding Applicability of Jihad
In the light of the Quran and Sunna, as well as writings of jurists, there appears to be little consensus as to what the conclusive rules for jihad are. The safest line of analysis might lie in arguing that a particular injunction came about in keeping with the dictates of time. It will also be relevant to mention here that in line with Quranic hermeneutics, every rule has many alternatives. Thus on a continuum, one will witness options ranging from strict punishment to complete forgiveness. 72 Ibid., 57. 73 These views are also propounded, Khadduri, op. cit., fn. 12. 74 For a detailed discussion on the doctrine of jihad, also ibid., 55-82. 75 Khadduri argues that although it was not a consciously formulated policy, Muhammads' early successors, after Islam became supreme in Arabia, were determined to embark on a ceaseless war of conquest in the name of Islam. The jihad was therefore employed as an instrument for both universalisation of religion and the establishment of an imperial world order, ibid., 55.
The question one must ask here is: why have the strictest and most extreme measures been adopted as law without leaving room for the less harsh alternatives? An example of this ambiguity and alternatives may be demonstrated in jihad against apostates. Mahmassani defines apostasy as abjuration of Islam, committed voluntarily by a Muslim, either by words or by acts. 76 He believes that there are two courses open to an apostate from Islam. He/she is first invited to return to Islam. If he/she fails to comply, he/she is then liable to capital punishment according to the prevalent Hanafi School, 77 on the basis of a Hadith of the Prophet which says 'He who changes his religion must be killed'. 78 But there is a Quranic verse that appears to establish a different rule by proclaiming that 'There is no compulsion in religion'. 79 If however apostasy is collective and is accompanied by secession or desertion to the enemy, then it justifies declaration of war. In such a case, it is equivalent to rebellion and discord (fitnah), which, in terms of the Quran, is worse and more serious than murder. 80 Badr also states that, according to the true interpretation of the Quran, not mere renunciation of Islam but becoming an enemy of Muslim society and state was punishable.
81 He refers to a hadith where an individual was brought to the Prophet Muhammad, so that the penalty of apostasy would be applied to him. He had thrown his spear out in the desert wanting to kill God because he had lost a beloved woman whom he had wanted to marry. When brought to the Prophet Muhammad to stand trial, the response of the Prophet was 'Isn't it enough for you to believe in God?' The man was not brought to trial, and the penalty was not applied. As Badr describes it, apostasy was more a political question than anything else, comparable in modern laws with treason. It was withdrawal from Islam, taking action against the Islamic nation in a treasonous sense, as opposed to the individual's choice of adopting a different type of belief. Another school of thought argued that denial of Islam, the surrender in peace to God, was the essence of apostasy.
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A further question arising out of our discussion of permissible jihad lies in using it as a means of converting non-Muslims to the Islamic faith. Here too, there appears an element of conflict between freedom of religion and the goal of converting people to Islam. Hamidullah is of the view that although no one may be forced to embrace the Islamic faith, yet Islamic rule is to be established by all 76 'There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction has become distinct from error'. Similarly, Verse CIX:6 says 'Unto you your religion and me my religion'. Some Muslim scholars on jihad argue that when a Muslim state is free from internal commotion and strife and has sufficient power to hope for victory in case of resistance, then it is its duty to invite the neighbouring non-Muslim sovereigns to accept the unity of God as an article of faith and believe in Muhammad as the Messenger of God. If they do, they will retain their power and will secure themselves against hostility on the part of the Muslim state. If the invitation is rejected, the non-Muslim chief within the Arabian peninsula has no other choice but to face the sword. If, however, his territory is outside Arabia, the alternative is to pay a yearly jizyah or the protection tax, which will secure his territory against Muslim attack. If both these alternatives are rejected and all peaceful persuasion and reasoning fail, then it is the duty of the Muslim State to declare war in the name of God until it conquers and receives the jizyah or has the gratification of knowing that the other party has at last embraced Islam. 83 With regard to the above justifications for jihad, it is submitted that it would be difficult to uphold this opinion on some counts. First and foremost is the inherent contradiction between conversion to Islam by the use of force and freedom of religion verses mentioned above. Second, how valid would these alternatives be in a multi-national world where there is no single Muslim state entity as envisaged in the arguments of Muslim jurists?
Moreover, the distinctive features of dar-al-Islam and dar-al-harb itself have undergone a change over the centuries. States that would have come within the purview of dar-al-harb now no longer answer to that description. A broad definition of dar-al-Islam is 'any territory whose inhabitants observe Muslim law'. To further narrow this down, one would have to pose the question: Must Islamic law be observed by the majority of the people, by a considerable number of them, or are there any other conditions required for a territory to be termed dar-al-Islam? It is stated that in order that a Muslim territory be regarded as dar-al-Islam, the believer should be able to freely fulfil his/her religious obligations. One of the tests was whether prayers on Fridays and Eid (feast days) could be held in the territory. 84 On this definition, British India was considered by Muslim scholars as a dar-al-Islam. 85 On the same analogy, one may argue that western states, such as Britain, today also qualifies as dar-al-Islam, 86 thus in turn leading to a re-evaluation of the divisions of dar-al-harb and dar-al-Islam. On the definition given above, very few, if any, countries of the world would qualify as other than dar-al-Islam.
ISLAMIC LAW, JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO
In common with general international law in prescribing, the laws relating to the use of force (jus ad bellum), Islamic law and as-siyar also regulate the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello). Although Islamic law attempted to inject strong humanitarian precepts in warfare, the jus in bello principles are often heavily intertwined with jus ad bellum. In the Islamic tradition, substantial limitations are placed in conducting warfare. 87 As examined in the earlier sections, war is permissible and is regarded as an integral part of human existence. As-siyar has, however, from the outset, endeavoured to develop regulatory norms for the conduct of wars and conflicts. Although not entirely synonymous, the Islamic humanitarian laws are in line with rules of modern international humanitarian law. 88 Within as-siyar, there exist clear rules relating inter alia to, notice of commencement of hostilities, unless it is a defensive war, effects of war, methods of warfare, organisation of the army and navy, modes of fighting, time of fighting, preparation, discipline and regulation of the army. The jihad manifested in war is to be conducted under certain rules, which though originating in the seventh and eighth century, are still relevant today. Rules for the conduct of warfare created a category of protected persons. A distinction is made between combatants and enemy non-combatants. Those non-combatants who are unable to participate in hostilities are classed as protected persons and cannot be attacked, killed or otherwise molested. 89 Jurists differ on many details concerning protected persons, but there is general agreement that they include children, women, 90 the very old, blind, crippled, disabled (mentally and physically disabled) and sick. 91 In addition to these, 'monks and hermits who retire to a life of solitude in monasteries or cloisters, and other priests who do not associate with other people' are also to be categorised as protected persons. 92 Mahmassani cites an incident where the Caliph Abu Bakr forbade his commander from harming any religious person. 93 These instructions are in line with rules regarding inviolability of places of worship stated in the Quran in the following terms:
